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THIS essay is written from the vantage point of 
a comparative theologian who is personally 
steeped in the Eastern Orthodox Christian 
tradition and who primarily specializes in 
Christian-Muslim comparative theology. It 
might seems curious, then, that the present 
essay employs the comparative theological 
method in order to focus on questions of 
theodicy in the Christian and Hindu traditions. 
Perhaps even more curious, however, is that I 
aim not at articulating a comparative Christian-
Hindu theodicy, but rather at suggesting that 
the most productive path forward is a 
comparative theological rejection of theodicy as 
a productive enterprise. Drawing from 
resources within my own Orthodox Christian 
tradition, as well as from the thought of Paul 
Ricoeur, my essay will revolve around two 
primary arguments: first, theodicy functions 
primarily to reconcile human beings to evil’s 
existence, thus legitimizing it and reducing the 
need to counteract evil; and second, religious 
traditions more effectively encounter the 
question of evil by teaching a path by which 
practitioners can mourn, reject, combat, and 
transform evil. Accordingly, I will first briefly 
examine two salient instances of comparative 
Christian-Hindu theodicy in order to 
demonstrate how my approach differs. Next, I 
will engage with key critics of theodicy, some of 
whom are skeptical of religion (or even hostile 
to it), and some of whom are religious adherents 
who maintain theodicy is an inherently 
deleterious mode of thought. I will conclude by 
drawing from both Fyodor Dostoevsky and Paul 
Ricoeur in order to suggest a more productive 
trajectory for comparative theology and the 
challenges posed by the existence of evil and 
suffering. 
Theodicy in its most narrow sense is a 
distinctive feature of the Abrahamic 
monotheisms, perhaps Christianity most of all. 
Rico G. Monge’s teaching and research focuses on comparative theology, continental philosophy of 
religion (including theodicy), and the history of Christian theology (including Catholic, Protestant, and 
Eastern Orthodox theology). As a comparative theologian, Monge specializes in Christian and Islamic 
mystical and ascetic traditions. Holding degrees in literature, theology, and religious studies, he also 
explores religious and philosophical themes in literature and film. He is the founding co-chair of the 
Catholic Studies Group of the American Academy of Religion’s Western Region and an associate editor of 
the journal Medieval Mystical Theology. He has recently published the edited volume, Hagiography and 
Religious Truth: Case Studies in the Abrahamic and Dharmic Traditions (Bloomsbury, 2016). Monge is also an 
ordained deacon in the Eastern Orthodox Church. 
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John Milton’s Paradise Lost is theodicy in the 
form of an epic poem, for, as Milton plainly 
states, his goal is to “justify the ways of God to 
men.” 1  The term theodicy itself, coined by 
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, etymologically 
suggests that the purpose is to render a 
satisfactory justification of God.2 In this narrow 
and culturally specific sense, then, theodicy is 
particularly a problem for the Abrahamic 
monotheisms, all of which maintain that there is 
only one God—and that this God is both 
omnibenevolent and omnipotent. 3  If these 
tenets are held to be so, theodicy becomes a 
particular difficulty, for as David Hume (and 
others) have succinctly put it, “Is [God] willing 
to prevent evil, but not able? Then is he 
impotent. Is he able but not willing? Then is he 
malevolent. Is he both able and willing? Whence 
then is evil?”4 While Hume means this to be a 
skeptic’s attack on the impossibility of a 
satisfactory Christian theodicy, the issues he 
raises are the very issues that Christian (and 
Islamic and Jewish theologians) have grappled 
with for millennia.  
Nevertheless, while the term theodicy has 
culturally specific origins in the philosophical 
and theological traditions of Abrahamic 
monotheism, meaningful attempts to explain 
the existence of evil and suffering exist in every 
major religious tradition. Francis X. Clooney, for 
example, has engaged in nuanced comparative 
theodicy between the Christian and Hindu 
traditions. In his focused study on Vedanta 
Desika and Thomas Aquinas, he argues that 
despite their significant differences, “There is 
no reason not to see Desika and Aquinas as allies 
sharing the same goal of putting evil back in its 
subordinate place, giving meaning to suffering 
and hope to those who suffer, more forcefully 
extolling the goodness of God, and, in the end, 
bolstering a comparative project that uses 
discourses on evil for the sake of a even greater 
good than the one that either theological 
tradition could have envisioned on its own.”5 In 
doing so, Clooney highlights the practical 
import of theodicy; it does not serve primarily 
simply to render belief in God/gods logically 
coherent, but also to: 1) “put evil in its place”; 2) 
grant meaning to suffering; 3) give hope to the 
suffering; 4) justify the goodness of God; and 5) 
promote the good. Clooney’s analysis here is 
deeply insightful concerning the roles theodicy 
overtly plays for the religious insider. We shall 
return to the difficulties created by this classical 
approach below. In order to transition there, we 
must first examine Clooney’s interaction with 
Peter Berger on the question of theodicy in a 
Hindu context. 
In his 1989 article focused on Vedanta’s 
theology of Karma, Clooney adds much-needed 
theological nuance to Berger’s sociological 
reading of the kind of theodicy “karma-
samsara” provides.6 Drawing from Max Weber, 
Berger argues that theodicies exist on a 
spectrum of how highly “rationalized” they are, 
and argues that the principle of karma-samsara 
in the dharmic religious traditions stands at the 
most highly rationalized pole. Clooney notes 
that Berger does not “directly engage Vedanta 
thinking” in his analysis and thus misses that 
the Vedantic perspective is “not rationalistic,” 
“frustrates reason's quest for a neat explanation 
by maintaining the irreconcilable poles of 
freedom and predestination,” and mitigates the 
mechanistic aspects of karma by “reserving to 
brahman-who is pure intelligence and being and 
joy-the efficacy of the system,” thereby 
ensuring “that humans are not hopelessly lost in 
the system or at the mercy of impersonal 
forces.”7 In short, Clooney argues that Vedantic 
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thinking accomplishes the classic goals of 
theodicy outlined in the paragraph above. While 
Clooney is correct that a more nuanced 
understanding of Vedanta would shift karma-
samsara’s location on Berger’s spectrum, 
Clooney’s analysis also paradoxically reinforces 
that Vedantic theodicy is subject to the critiques 
leveled by Berger (as well as the critiques of the 
thinkers to whom Berger is most deeply 
indebted, Weber, Karl Marx, and Friedrich 
Nietzsche).  
Indeed, the very fact that Clooney places 
Vedanta Desika and Thomas Aquinas so closely 
together itself strongly suggests Berger’s cross-
cultural analysis of the function of theodicy 
remains as potent as ever. For Berger’s primary 
contention is that theodicy is central to a 
religion’s ability to create a “sacred canopy” 
that binds a culture together and affords it some 
protection against the otherwise meaningless 
chaos of the universe. For Berger, theodicy is 
thus not ultimately about justifying God’s 
goodness to human beings, but, rather, “the 
legitimation of anomic phenomena.” 8  Put 
otherwise, Berger argues that sociologically, 
theodicy functions to legitimize why things that 
cultural norms and expectations would dictate 
“should not happen,” do, in fact, happen all the 
time. Theodicy thus provides the way for human 
beings to accept why the “anomic” or “evil” can 
occur. Even more problematic, systems of 
theodicy provide paths by which these 
occurrences can further be understood as both 
legitimate and necessary. Four of the five points I 
distilled from Clooney’s comparison of Desika 
and Aquinas thus demonstrate Berger’s point; 
theodicy provides human beings with the 
reassurance and hope that things are as they 
should be, and, further, that they will work for 
the best according to a higher plan. If 1) evil has 
been “put in its place”; 2) suffering has been 
granted meaning; 3) hope has been given to 
those who suffer; and 4) the goodness of God has 
been justified, has Berger not been largely 
vindicated? Evil has certainly not been “put in 
its place” other than intellectually. Granting 
meaning to suffering renders suffering 
“moralized” according to Nietzsche’s most 
potent critiques, potentially redoubling the 
guilt of those who are already suffering and 
unable to convert that suffering into moral 
benefit.9 Providing hope to the suffering, if this 
comes without addressing and eradicating the 
root causes of suffering, offers little more than 
what Marx aptly identified as the “opiate of the 
masses.”10 Finally, “justifying the ways of God to 
men” is, by definition, the attempt to 
legitimize—even valorize—why an 
omnibenevolent and omnipotent God permits 
so much suffering and evil.  
We will return to Clooney’s fifth point, “to 
promote the good,” at the end of this essay. For 
now, let us investigate further the question 
concerning whether theodicy is helpful or 
harmful to religions themselves, and, more 
importantly, to their adherents. Western 
Christian (i.e. Catholic and Protestant) theodicy 
from Augustine to Leibniz (arguably its most 
sophisticated expositor) has revolved around 
these very objectives of providing reassurance 
and hope to human beings, and thus to reconcile 
them to the fact that evil and suffering exist. 
Augustine agonizes over why evil could exist 
throughout his Confessions, finally concluding 
that it is Christianity that offers the only 
satisfactory answer. For him, the resolution (or 
in Berger’s terms “legitimation”) of evil is to be 
found in his twin arguments that 1) evil does not 
exist, but is a falling away from God who is pure 
Being, and 2) that human beings possess free 
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will such that even our falling away towards 
non-Being is not God’s fault but ours.11 Several 
centuries later, Thomas Aquinas adhered closely 
to Augustinian theodicy while tackling the 
thorny issue of causality and responsibility. For 
Aquinas, God’s role as providential creator 
means that God is, in a certain causal sense, the 
origin of evil (and human free will is not 
sufficient to erase that fact). Free will, however, 
ensures that “God is responsible for sinful 
actions, but not for sins,” or, in other words, God 
is causally responsible but not morally 
responsible for evil.12 Leibniz, working out this 
paradox even more rigorously, posited that this 
world is the best of all possible worlds “not only 
for all in general, but for each one of us in 
particular.”13 In each of these pivotal figures the 
bottom line affirms both Clooney’s and Berger’s 
analyses concerning the function of theodicy. 
And lest I give the impression that Eastern 
Christianity is immune to or free from engaging 
in theodicy, one need only look at Dionysius the 
Areopagite’s The Divine Names and John of 
Damascus’s The Orthodox Faith for 
recapitulations of Augustinian theodicy.14 Even 
John Hick’s exposition of Irenaeus of Lyons’s 
theodicy shows a deep Eastern Christian affinity 
for the idea that evil and suffering are necessary 
for moral growth. 15  We shall return to the 
question of Irenaean theodicy in the discussion 
of Ricoeur below.  
One might naturally ask at this point, “so 
what’s the problem with theodicy?” For 
Friedrich Nietzsche and Max Weber, theodicy 
demonstrates the human desire to impose 
meaning and value on what would otherwise be 
senseless and random suffering. This endeavor 
to use human rational faculties to create 
meanings for suffering that are not actually 
there reflects a childish inability to accept the 
world as it actually is. It devalues the world and 
our present lives by deferring existence as it 
“should be” to the next life.16 17 Building upon 
Nietzsche and Weber, Berger, as we have seen, 
argues that theodicy serves to make us 
reconciled to the “anomic” phenomena we 
would otherwise categorically reject. In the 
wake of the horrors of the 20th century, many 
Christian theologians are beginning to 
recognize these deleterious aspects of 
theodicy’s core functions. Karen Kilby, for 
example, argues that Christianity should not be 
engaged in theodicy, that theodicy has nothing 
to do with the Gospel of Jesus Christ, and that 
theodicy makes us less likely to feel compelled 
to carry out one of the primary duties of the 
Christian: to combat evil. 18  Moreover, Sarah 
Katherine Pinnock has gathered together 
contributions from leading Christian and Jewish 
philosophers in an effort to move “beyond 
theodicy,” not because theodicy is inadequate to 
make sense of the horrors of the 
Holocaust/Shoah (Leibniz would indeed have an 
“adequate” answer), but because making sense 
of it, rendering it meaningful, and thus 
legitimizing its occurrence is not remotely 
desirable.19 
What then should be done? Are theology 
and religion separable from theodicy? As 
Clooney observes with Desika, theodicy does not 
always provide neat answers, and both 
Christianity and Hinduism have robust mystical 
traditions asserting the ultimate unknowability 
of the divine. Does emphasis on divine 
incomprehensibility escape the problems 
wrought by theodicy? David Hume, Ludwig 
Feuerbach, and Sigmund Freud each argue that 
while recourse to unknowability may indemnify 
God from critique, it also eradicates the very 
thing—theodicy—that, in their views, makes 
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religion attractive to human beings in the first 
place. Hume, for example, maintains that those 
who uphold the unknowability of God are 
“atheists without knowing it.” 20  Similarly, 
Feuerbach claims that the “theory that God 
cannot be defined, and consequently cannot be 
known by man, is therefore the offspring of 
recent times, a product of modern unbelief.”21 
Freud draws out the practical implications 
rather succinctly when he asserts, “If you 
confine yourself to the belief in a higher 
spiritual being, whose qualities are indefinable 
and whose intentions cannot be discerned, then 
you are proof against the interference of 
science, but then you will also relinquish the 
interest of men.” 22  Stripped of the hope, 
comfort, and security that theodicy’s 
legitimations provide, religion will lose its 
psychological appeal for the majority of human 
beings. Augmenting these philosophical and 
psychological ruminations, Berger employs 
empirical sociological evidence to demonstrate 
that the decline of a religion’s plausibility is 
directly proportional to the devaluation of its 
corresponding theodicy. 23  It would seem then 
that religion can survive neither with theodicy 
nor without it. 
The writings of Fyodor Dostoevsky and Paul 
Ricoeur present other options, however, ones 
that are particularly promising for comparative 
theological engagement with evil and suffering. 
Curiously enough, their approaches have 
significant resonances with aspects of Freudian 
thought.24 In The Brothers Karamazov, Dostoevsky 
famously enlists the character of Ivan 
Karamazov to utterly destroy theodicy in the 
chapters entitled “Rebellion” and “The Grand 
Inquisitor.” Quite strikingly, however, Ivan’s 
devout brother (and novice monk) Alyosha 
accepts Ivan’s dismantling of Christian theodicy 
without abandoning his faith. 25  Furthermore, 
Alyosha’s spiritual father, the Elder Zosima, 
nowhere engages in theodicy, including the 
section of the novel (Book VI: The Russian 
Monk) that Dostoevsky openly referred to as his 
response to Ivan. 26  Instead of a theodicy that 
would impose meaning on evil and suffering in 
order to render them “legitimate,” Alyosha and 
Zosima embody a way of being in the world that 
combats evil through radical love—a love that 
has the power to transfigure everything it 
touches. When Alyosha asserts that the love of 
life is of the utmost importance, Ivan is 
incredulous and suggests that understanding 
the meaning of life is still more important, 
because only if life is meaningful is it lovable. 
Alyosha’s pivotal response is that he must love 
life first of all “and only then will I also 
understand its meaning.”27 The reversal here is 
more profound in its implications than it might 
seem at first. For Alyosha, evil and suffering are 
not things to be comprehended, tamed, and 
rendered acceptable through logical, discursive 
explanations. Rather, it is love, not logic, which 
infuses existence with meaning and empowers 
one to combat and transform evil and suffering, 
rather than concocting an explanation for why 
it exists.  
This power of radical love is demonstrated 
throughout Zosima’s discourses in “The Russian 
Monk,” but perhaps nowhere more poignantly 
than in the story of his older brother Markel, 
who died of tuberculosis while still a teenager. 
Previously a skeptic, Markel undergoes a 
dramatic conversion in which he is filled with 
love for all of existence—for his fellow human 
beings as well as for the natural world. Nowhere 
does Markel seek (or find) a rational explanation 
for why such a terrible fate should befall him. 
When his doctor lies to him stating he will live 
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for a long time yet, Markel dismisses the length 
of his life as irrelevant: “But what are years, 
what are months! …. Why count the days, when 
even one day is enough for a man to know all 
happiness? My dears, why do we quarrel, boast 
before each other, remember each other’s 
offenses? Let us go to the garden, let us walk and 
play and love and praise and kiss each other and 
bless our life.”28  Even more forcefully, Markel 
asserts that such love reveals that “life is 
paradise, but we do not want to know it, and if 
we did want to know it, tomorrow there would 
be paradise the world over.” 29  Nevertheless, 
nowhere does Markel engage in even an 
Irenaean theodicy that would moralize and 
validate his deadly illness because it allowed 
him to achieve this all-encompassing love. On 
the contrary, it is the transfiguring power of 
love that renders the question “Why me?” 
utterly irrelevant.  
As compelling as Markel’s story may be, 
Dostoevsky was a man intimately acquainted 
with the depths of human suffering, and 
Markel’s example alone does not convey the 
fullness of Dostoevsky’s response to Ivan’s 
destruction of theodicy. Equally crucial are 
Zosima’s ruminations on the book of Job. While 
Job is often viewed as the supreme example of 
Judeo-Christian scriptural theodicy, Zosima 
instead reads the text as a sort of manual in 
learning how to grieve over suffering and evil. 
Indeed, Zosima notes that the story of Job, read 
as a theodicy explaining evil, is both ludicrous 
and offensive. “How could the Lord hand over 
the most beloved of his saints for Satan to play 
with him, to take away his children, to smite him 
with disease and sores so that he scraped the pus 
from his wounds with a potsherd, and all for 
what? Only so as to boast before Satan: ‘See what 
my saint can suffer for my sake!’” 30  Rejecting 
this reading, Zosima asserts “what is great here” 
in the book of Job is its demonstration of the 
possibility of healing in which “old grief, by a 
great mystery of human life, gradually passes 
into quiet, tender joy.” 31  To sum up, what 
Dostoevsky shows us is the power of Christianity 
not to explain evil and suffering, but rather to 
combat it, transform it, and to learn how to 
productively grieve over it. 
Though not himself Orthodox, the 
Protestant Paul Ricoeur likewise rejects 
theodicy and expresses an ethos that resonates 
heavily with Doestoevsky’s Orthodoxy. In his 
essay, “Evil, a Challenge to Philosophy and 
Theology,” Ricoeur surveys the history of 
Christian theodicy and critiques it heavily for 
the same reasons expressed throughout this 
essay. He then sets forth his alternative vision of 
how the texts of the Bible address the challenge 
of evil. Rather than offering a logical 
explanation of evil subject to “both the rule of 
noncontradiction and that of systematic 
totalization,” Ricoeur argues that Biblical texts 
instead (1) enjoin us to act against evil, and (2) 
offer us a five-stage path of wisdom through 
which we can learn how to grieve.32 Contrary to 
theodicy, which asks “whence comes evil,” 
Ricoeur argues, “the response, not the solution, 
of action is to act against evil. Our vision is thus 
turned toward the future, by the idea of a task to 
be accomplished.” 33  Ricoeur thus argues that 
Biblical texts offer hope, but a hope that imposes 
a responsibility on us. The potential of theodicy 
to make us complacent towards the evil it 
legitimizes is thereby removed, and in its place 
stands the burden to fight against evil with all 
our might. But Ricoeur also recognizes that 
action against evil is not enough in and of itself. 
This is because evil is not merely something one 
“commits”; evil is also something one undergoes 
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and from which one suffers intense trauma and 
grief.  
For this reason, Ricoeur sets forth the five-
stage path he has gleaned from the Christian 
scriptures for learning how to grieve. In doing 
so, Ricoeur acknowledges he is also indebted to 
Freud’s essay “Mourning and Melancholia.” In 
the first stage of this “work of mourning,” 
Ricoeur advocates for the exact opposite of 
theodicy—the admission of ignorance. Only in 
admitting to ourselves that we cannot make 
sense of suffering can we begin to heal from it. 
From this first stage of ignorance, we can then 
move to a second, perhaps even more surprising 
stage: complaint against God. It must be stressed 
that Ricoeur is not abstractly philosophizing 
here; he is following the example set forth by 
the psalmists who both profess ignorance of 
why evil happens, and, at times, rage against 
God for the fact that it does happen. Only by 
passing through genuine rage can we come to 
the third stage, the realization that theodicy is 
not the reason or precondition for belief. 
Instead, we come to find that “suffering is only 
a scandal for the person who understands God to 
be the source of everything that is good in 
creation, including our indignation against evil, 
our courage to bear it, and our feeling of 
sympathy toward victims. In other words, we 
believe in God in spite of evil.”34 We find ourselves 
here far from both the security blanket offered 
by theodicy and from the poor refuge of the 
unknowable God (and practical atheism) 
critiqued by Hume, Feuerbach, and Freud.  
We might here pause for a moment to ask 
whether we have become too polemical and 
thus blind to some of the insights theodicy 
genuinely has to offer. Does not the educative, 
Irenaean model of theodicy have some truth to 
it, at least? In the fourth and fifth stages of 
learning how to mourn, Ricoeur (and I) would 
answer with a cautious “yes.” In the fourth 
stage, a person may come to a place where they 
discern in suffering “some educative and 
purgative value.” 35  The crucial distinction 
between this fourth stage and theodicy is that 
the fourth stage does not signify the 
construction of a totalizing system. The ability 
to discern educative value in suffering is neither 
an imperative to discover it, nor the assertion 
that such educative value necessarily exists in 
every instance of suffering. The fourth stage 
allows the individual to work out the particulars 
of his or her own grief, whereas theodicy runs 
the risk of “leading the victim back along the 
route of self-accusation or self-destruction.”36 In 
other words, it is good and proper to affirm what 
value a person can come to find in his or her 
suffering, while it is harmful and cruel to impose 
on each person the imperative to find meaning 
and value in suffering. In the final stage along 
the path of wisdom, one may ultimately come to 
“love God for naught” just as Job does at the end 
of his tale of unfathomable suffering. In 
reaching this stage, a person can find an 
extraordinary degree of liberation and power 
over suffering and evil. As Ricoeur puts it, “to 
love God for naught is to escape completely the 
cycle of retribution to which the lament [of 
stages 1-3] remains captive, so long as the victim 
bemoans the injustice of his or her fate.” 37 
Again, it cannot be stressed enough that this is 
neither a moral imperative nor an explanation 
of the “purpose” of evil. The fifth stage is about 
reaching a place of liberation and empowerment 
that has no need of theodicy whatsoever.  
Ricoeur concludes his essay with a 
suggestion for a productive future trajectory for 
interreligious reflection upon evil and suffering. 
Having laid out his reading of the five-stage path 
7
Monge: The Limits of Theodicy: An Eastern Orthodox Perspective on Evil a
Published by Digital Commons @ Butler University, 2016
The Limits of Theodicy: An Eastern Orthodox Perspective on Evil and Interreligious Theology 43 
of Judeo-Christian wisdom, he suggests, 
“perhaps this horizon of wisdom, at least as it 
appears in the West under the influence of 
Judaism and Christianity, overlaps the horizon 
of Buddhist wisdom at a significant crossing 
point that only a long dialogue between them 
could make more conspicuous….” 38  While 
Ricoeur, without explanation, specifies 
Buddhism here as a dialogue partner, it should 
be clear that the same sentiment would hold 
true for Vedantic wisdom. How might karma-
samsara show up radically differently if we were 
to focus on how it guides adherents in 
combatting evil and learning how to mourn? 
How might comparative theological 
engagement along these lines yield real, practical 
value in dealing with evil and suffering? With 
Ricoeur, I suggest this is the most productive 
path forward in interreligious engagement with 
the question of evil.  
The time is ripe for further comparative 
investigations of the wisdom by which religious 
traditions guide adherents in the face of evil. In 
doing so, we will not only avoid the dangers and 
pitfalls of theodicy, we will almost assuredly 
empower people of all faith traditions to more 
effectively confront the evil and suffering that 
comes to us all. How might the insights of 
Clooney’s fifth point, “to promote the good,” 
come to greater fruition through Hindu-
Christian reflection on evil and suffering? I will 
close this essay by highlighting one recent 
constructive work of theology from within the 
Hindu tradition, Anantanand Rambachan’s A 
Hindu Theology of Liberation: Not-Two Is Not 
One.39 Like Dostoevsky and Ricoeur, Rambachan 
is wary of the way the term “theology” has been 
used in the past, as well as the role it has played 
in legitimizing suffering rather than promoting 
the good and strengthening the ability of 
religious practitioners to combat evil, be 
liberated from suffering, and to learn to grieve 
in ways that do not further compound one’s 
suffering.40 For Rambachan, the role of theology 
is not to provide a theodicy that legitimizes evil 
by “problematizing the world,” but, rather, to 
bring about “liberation.” In his words, 
“Liberation is a new understanding of self and 
world. The consequence of knowing oneself to 
be a full being is freedom from greed. One shares 
the most profound identity with all beings when 
one knows oneself to be the self of all. Wisdom 
blossoms in compassion, that is, the seeing of 
oneself in the sorrows and joys of others, in 
generosity, and in self-control.”41 With Clooney, 
Dostoevsky, Ricoeur, and Rambachan, a new 
future for comparative and interreligious 
theological reflection is upon us—provided we 
can continue to escape the limits and pitfalls of 
theodicy. 
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